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Introduction 
  The San Joaquin Valley, long the heart of California's agricultural industry, has a climate 
similar in many ways to those of interior Australia and parts of the Middle East, and like those 
areas has experienced a gradual increase of salinity in its groundwater and surface waters. For 
many years dating back to when an extensive network of pumps and canals was developed for 
water conveyance to and through the Valley in the 1930s, the principal economic activity has 
been commercial agriculture. Today the Valley remains heavily agricultural, though it is also a 
hub  of  non-agricultural  business,  as  well  as  urban  and  suburban  development.  All  of  these 
activities  have  contributed  to  the  accumulation  of  salinity  because  typically  water  used  by 
businesses, households, and farmers returns to the region's groundwater and surface waters with 
a  little  more  salt  and  minerals  than  before  it  was  used.  This  phenomenon  is  especially 
pronounced because, unlike most other areas of California, in large parts of the San Joaquin 
Valley water does not flow to the ocean. Instead, impermeable clay layers in the subsoil cause 
water to remain in the Valley, and it is reused over and over as it is pumped from the ground and 
the surface to meet the region's water needs. 
  Relatively  little is known about the effects of increasing salinity on Valley economic 
activity, and most of what is known is applicable to businesses and agriculture rather than to 
households and residents. Households and residents can be expected to experience two types of 
effects, broadly, related to the gradual buildup of salinity. The first is “private” costs, incurred 
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personally either through accelerated household appliance and water fixture replacement cycles, 
or to finance the efforts of public agencies (such as municipal water management agencies) to 
mitigate the increases in salinity of public water supply.
2 The second set of effects are more 
public in nature, as the long-term buildup of salinity is expected to cause changes in land use 
and, potentially, in environmental quality.
3  They include reductions in land used for agricultural 
production, considered by many a quasi-public good because of the desirability of maintaining 
Valley land in production agriculture both because of tourism opportunities it affords and its 
importance  to  the  regional  economy  (e.g.,  Abdulla;  Fleisher  and  Tsur;  Pruckner;  UC  AIC).  
These reductions could occur either in a planned way (through land retirement programs) or 
through land abandonment, as salinity reduces crop yields and agricultural profitability.  Other 
changes in public goods to be expected if the trend in salinity increase continues unabated are 
changes in the number and size of Valley wetlands that support local wildlife and migrating 
waterfowl  populations;  and,  potentially,  changes  in  Valley  air  quality  if  agricultural  land 
abandonment is widespread, because more bare soil will be exposed for greater periods during 
the year to the region's regular and at times very strong winds. These indirect effects of salinity 
increase may be important because of the scale of the potential effects, and because many people 
could  be  affected  (and  might  be  willing  to  fund  programs  to  prevent  those  effects  from 
occurring).   
The purpose of this paper is to provide some recent empirical evidence on the potential 
economic  costs  of  changes  in  public  or  quasi-public  goods  availability  and  quality  as  a 
consequence of increasing surface and groundwater salinity, which (to our knowledge) has not 
                                                 
2 There is a small literature that presents engineering economics estimates of the magnitudes of these private costs 
(e.g., Ragan et al.; Cismowski et al.; Coe; BEEI; Andersen and Kleinman; D’Arge and Eubanks; and Lohman and 
Milliken). 
3 A number of authoritative reports have documented the basis for expecting such land use changes (US Fish and 
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been done previously.  We do this by assessing the public’s willingness to pay to prevent salinity 
increases  beyond  their  levels  in  2007,  using  two  complementary  approaches,  contingent 
valuation and choice experiments.  As part of the application of these methods, the best available 
scientific information about the potential consequences of long term increases in salinity on the 
three regional public goods noted above was explained to respondents.  Thus, they were aware 
that  paying  to  prevent  future  increases  in  Valley  salinity  levels  was  expected  also  to  have 
predictable effects on the amount of land in production agriculture and in wetlands, as well as on 
particulate concentrations in Valley air (reflected in the most common indicator of its health 
consequences, the number of premature deaths caused).   
The questions asked in the two data collection approaches are complementary, and they 
are  combined  in  estimation  to  provide  a  more  comprehensive  evaluation  of  the  salinity 
willingness to pay problem than could be done with either alone.  Repeated mixed logit (RXL) 
models are used to estimate the choice probabilities associated with whether respondents are 
willing  to  pay  for  salinity  management.    The  approach  yields  estimates  of  both  monthly 
willingness to pay for salinity management and incremental willingness to pay for changes in 
land in agriculture, land in wetlands, and premature deaths.  
  The remainder of this paper is organized as is as follows. The next section provides an 
overview of the literature on the effects of salinity build-up, the survey design, and the data 
collected and used in estimation.  We then describe our RXL model of respondents’ program 
selections.   Following the discussion of our modeling approach, we present estimation results 
and  preliminary  findings  regarding  willingness  to  pay  for  San  Joaquin  Valley  salinity 
management (the prevention of  future salinity  increases) and  for  incremental  changes  in the Preliminary draft – please do not cite without authors’ permission 
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associated public and quasi-public goods.  In the last section, we set out directions for future 
work. 
 
Survey Design and Data Collection 
   
  The  design  of  a  study  to  measure  household  willingness  to  pay  for  prevention  of 
increased salinity of San Joaquin Valley water presents a number of challenges. First, the salinity 
problem itself may not be noticed by the average person in day-to-day life, because it occurs 
very gradually over long time periods. The ways in which it might be most directly observed by 
a typical Valley resident (e.g., through household drinking water) are mitigated by the actions of 
public authorities,  in this case public water supply  agencies required to meet drinking water 
standards. Second, many of its potential effects are not well known or understood, partly because 
it is difficult to extrapolate current trends into the relatively distant future, and partly because 
over longer periods, many other factors may shift either autonomously or in response to the 
problem. Third, a number of the consequences of salinity to the average Valley resident may be 
indirect, by causing changes in land use (e.g., for agriculture or residential development) and 
habitat for wildlife. People may well care about these land use changes, and be willing to pay to 
avoid their occurrence if they are perceived to be adverse, but the linkage to salinity increases is 
subtle.   
These  considerations  led  to  a  fairly  extensive  pre-testing  procedure,  with  twenty-two 
pretest  interview  sessions  conducted  in  the  San  Joaquin  and  Sacramento  Valley  cities  of 
Stockton,  Fresno,  and  Davis  (all  in  California),  which  probed  Valley  residents  about  their 
knowledge of the Valley salinity problem and their attitudes toward it.  Two major observations 
emerged from this process:  1) while the salinity problem was not well-known to respondents, it 
was easily understood and intuitively sensible to them, recognized as a problem to be taken Preliminary draft – please do not cite without authors’ permission 
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seriously; and 2) among the public goods changes that might occur with increased salinity, by far 
the  most  important  was  the  potential  for  degraded  air  quality  from  increased  particulates 
concentrations if production agricultural land were abandoned.  Air quality is now a considerable 
health concern, particularly  in the southern San Joaquin Valley (e.g., Hall et al.), and while 
particulates (and other pollutants) are regulated under both State and Federal standards, these are 
exceeded frequently for short periods of time.   
Relevant Literature on the Effects of Salinity Increases 
  In the literature on salinity in the Central Valley and other parts of the world (Australia, 
Israel), relatively few studies make quantitative assessments of the prospective long-term effects 
of salinity increases.  California’s San Joaquin Valley is an exception, because of the economic 
importance of the industries and resources affected.  There, a few studies have helped to increase 
public awareness of the trend toward increasing salinity of ground and surface water, and have 
suggested measures to help mitigate salinity increases and their effects  (US Fish and Wildlife 
Service; Cismowski et al.; Williams and Alemi). The “Rainbow Report” (US Fish and Wildlife 
Service),  in  particular,  was  an  ambitious  effort  to  project  the  expected  effects  of  increased 
salinity  on  the  Valley  over  a  relatively  long  (50-year)  period,  from  1990-2040,  and  to 
recommend plans for halting the salinity increase. While its projections necessarily are fairly 
speculative, it stands as the best projection (to our knowledge) by knowledgeable scientists and 
professionals of what the expected effects of increased salinity on the San Joaquin Valley could 
be.  
  Prominent among the effects of doing nothing to reduce salinity  increases, for which 
quantitative projections were made, were changes in acreage devoted to agricultural production, 
as the water table in some areas, notably in the Westlands Water District, rises and becomes Preliminary draft – please do not cite without authors’ permission 
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more saline. As many as 500,000 acres of irrigated agricultural lands could go out of production, 
reducing the total Valley agricultural lands from some 2.4 million acres in 1990 to 1.9 million 
acres in 2040. Changes in cropping patterns are also anticipated, from less salt-tolerant crops to 
more salt-tolerant crops, and projections were made of changes in economic returns from to 
commercial agricultural production and processing enterprises. A key issue highlighted in the 
Rainbow  Report  was  how  the  changes  in  agricultural  land  use  occur,  whether  by  planned 
retirement or abandonment of farmland. Retirement of land, ideally, is the outcome of a managed 
process and is expected to reduce groundwater levels and permit revegetation and rehabilitation 
of  the  land  for  wildlife  habitat.  Abandonment,  in  contrast,  may  result  in  considerably  less 
vegetative cover on former agricultural lands, and a greater exposure of the surface soil to winds, 
which could lead to increases in airborne particulates. 
  Other  land  use  changes  anticipated  by  the  Rainbow  Report  from  increasing  Valley 
salinity include a reduction in the amount of seasonal and permanent wetlands, and an increase in 
land used for residential and commercial development (though this will largely proceed with or 
without increases in salinity). The amount of seasonal and permanent wetlands could fall to as 
little as 24,000 acres, compared with 88,000 acres in 1990. 
In addition, the prospect of land abandonment under no salinity management (US Fish 
and  Wildlife  Service)  suggests  a  connection  between  agricultural  land  use  changes  and  air 
quality changes. Because of the likelihood that abandoned agricultural land would have bare soil 
exposed to Valley winds for long periods during the year, the prospect of atmospheric particulate 
concentrations increasing as an indirect consequence of agricultural land going out of production 
is not unreasonable. This, combined with the overriding importance placed on air quality by Preliminary draft – please do not cite without authors’ permission 
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Valley residents, suggested air quality changes  as a third dimension of salinity  management 
plans. 
  Thus, in light of both the available scientific information on possible long-term effects on 
Valley land use due to salinity, and the responses and concerns of focus group participants, it 
was decided to frame the household willingness to pay for salinity management around three 
main  indirect  dimensions:  1)  changes  in  agricultural  land  use;  2)  changes  in  seasonal  and 
permanent wetlands; and 3) changes in air quality. It is the public goods aspects of each of these 
that are relevant for measuring household willingness to pay.  
  Wetlands and improved air quality are, by their nature, public goods (i.e., goods that the 
public as a whole may benefit from), so it is unsurprising to expect that some households would 
be willing to pay for them. In contrast, agricultural land use is, in one sense, largely private; i.e., 
changes in land use will occur as a result of private landowners making their own decisions 
based on profitability and other considerations. On the other hand, the general public may care 
about agricultural land use changes because of a desire to preserve a way of life, or because of 
third-party effects (concerns about economic harm to rural communities or agriculture-dependent 
industries).  Consumers  may  also  be  willing  to  pay  to  maintain  larger  agricultural  acreages 
because  they  perceive  this  will  prevent  rises  in  food  prices  that  might  occur  if  agricultural 
production diminished.  
  To  determine  levels  of  these  three  public  goods  indirectly  provided  by  salinity 
management, the Rainbow Report analysis was used where possible. As noted earlier, the Report 
made explicit projections of both agricultural land changes and of wetlands changes under both a 
Salinity Management Plan that would halt the increase in salinity, and under No Management. 
Based  on  these  (and  modifying  somewhat  for  the  passage  of  time  since  1990),  the  salinity Preliminary draft – please do not cite without authors’ permission 
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management plan proposed in the willingness to pay analyses would halt the expected increases 
in Valley salinity from 2007 through 2040. It would also prevent a reduction of 400,000 acres in 
agricultural cropland, from 2.3 million acres to 1.9 million acres, and a reduction of 64,000 acres 
of seasonal and permanent wetlands, from 88,000 to 24,000. To develop plausible scenarios for 
air quality changes due to land abandonment (which also was projected in the Rainbow Report), 
it is necessary to consult recent work on attaining air quality standards in the Valley.  
  Hall et al. analyze the expected economic benefits of achieving attainment of the PM-2.5
4 
24-hour and annual air quality standards  in the  San  Joaquin Valley,  by  linking the required 
reductions  in particulates to a changes  in  health symptoms, and then applying  value or cost 
estimates to these. In the study, which is typical of air pollution economic cost studies, 97% of 
the economic cost of air pollution is due to premature deaths in the population of adults aged 30 
years  or  older.  Meeting  the  ambient  air  quality  standard  requires  a  reduction  in  PM-2.5 
concentration from 73.2 to 65.5 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m
3). Employing a widely-used 
standard methodology due to Pope et al., this translates to a 4.6% decrease in premature deaths in 
the San Joaquin Valley, which they estimate to be 460 per year. The baseline level of annual 
premature deaths implied by this analysis is approximately 10,400. 
  To get a plausible (though, like the other estimates, speculative) estimate of what might 
happen to particulate concentrations with land abandonment, the San Joaquin Valley Air Quality 
Management  District  (SJVAQMD)  particulate  management  plan  for  PM-10  was  consulted.
5   
According to the Emissions Inventory for San Joaquin Valley PM-10 (Table 3-5), 46% of Valley 
                                                 
4 This refers to very small particulates that are 2.5 microns or less in diameter. The other common particulate 
regulated by state and federal air pollution authorities is PM-10, particles 10 microns or smaller in diameter.  
5 There is currently no PM-2.5 management plan in place, though one is being formulated by the SJVAQMD. 
Agricultural operations typically produce larger (PM-10) particles, so the PM-10 plan and emissions inventory are 
especially relevant. As there appears to be no recent economic study of the benefits of attaining the PM-10 standard, 
the Hall et al. study was used instead. Preliminary draft – please do not cite without authors’ permission 
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PM-10  emissions  are  attributable  to  agriculture  and  food  processing  operations.  Given  an 
abandonment, in the extreme, of 17% of agricultural cropland in the Valley (400,000 acres out of 
about 2.3 million), and assuming cover  vegetation 50% of the time under production agriculture 
and none under abandonment, an additional wind exposure of bare soil roughly equivalent to 8% 
of the current acreage would be possible. This is a slightly larger percentage increase than the 
percentage decrease in PM-10 analyzed in the Hall et al. report (7.7 µg/m
3 reduction from a 
baseline of 73.2). Thus it seems not unreasonable that land abandonment could cause another 
460 premature deaths annually, for a total of 10,900 compared to 10,400 today. Put another way, 
this  would  be  a  4.8%  increase  in  particulate  concentration  from  a  17%  increase  in  land 
abandonment. 
  To summarize, then, the salinity management plan, by halting the rise in salinity, would 
have the  following  indirect effects on public good provision  from 2007-2040:  1) prevent a 
reduction  in  agricultural  cropland  from  2.3  to  1.9  million  acres;  2)  prevent  a  reduction  in 
seasonal and permanent wetlands from 88,000 to 24,000 acres; and 3) prevent an increase in 
premature deaths from 10,400 per year to 10,900 per year.  
 
The Willingness to Pay Question Formats 
  Two  nonmarket  valuation  strategies  were  incorporated  into  the  household  survey:  
contingent  valuation  (CV)  and  choice  experiments  (CEs).  The  two  approaches  are 
complementary, and may be used together provide more information about the features of the 
good being valued.  Contingent valuation seeks to place a monetary value on a specific, well-
defined management plan, usually by varying the amount of money people are asked to pay for it 
randomly  across  the  sample.  Choice  experiments,  in  contrast,  vary  the  features  of  the Preliminary draft – please do not cite without authors’ permission 
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management plan, including its cost, and ask respondents to choose which they prefer from a 
series of comparisons of different management plans with different features. 
  Since the contingent valuation presents a single plan to respondents, the projections of 
changes in agricultural cropland, permanent and seasonal wetlands, and premature deaths from 
air  pollution  that  were  developed  above  were  used.  The  contingent  valuation  had  two  basic 
versions, a single bound version (one willingness to pay question) and a double bound version 
(two questions, an initial question plus follow-up), with household cost per month being the only 
feature that varied, ranging from $3 to $54 depending on the specific payment format used. 
There were a total of 14 different payment formats, with each respondent only receiving a single 
contingent valuation format (Table 1). 
  The same basic design values for a salinity management plan motivated the choice of the 
levels of program features (or attributes) in the choice experiments. Choice experiments usually 
have additional, counterfactual, levels of each attribute of the program, to increase the variation 
in programs that respondents make choices between. Also, unlike contingent valuation, choice 
experiments  usually  ask  respondents  to  make  several  comparisons  between  programs  with 
different attribute levels. Depending on the complexity of the program being valued, as many as 
16 choice experiments per respondent are done. Our choice experiments asked respondents to 
make either 3 or 5 comparisons, and for each comparison to choose their preferred one from 
among  three  salinity  management  options.  One  option  in  each  comparison  was  no  salinity 
management, which had the No Plan attribute values listed in Table 1. The other two plans in 
each comparison, Plan A and Plan B, would limit the increase in salinity from 2007-2040 and 
had  different  attribute  values  selected  from  the  list  in  Table  1,  and  the  Plan  A  and  Plan  B 
attributes changed over the different comparisons. Since the number of possible combinations of Preliminary draft – please do not cite without authors’ permission 
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4 attributes, each taking 3 levels, is 3
4 = 81, which is greater than the number of survey versions 
used, an orthogonal design based on the Addelman 3
4 design, with cyclical generation and swaps 
to remove dominance and improve efficiency, was used (Bunch et al.; Huber and Zwerina; Arora 
and  Huber).  This  resulted  in  9  different  choice  formats  with  3  alternatives,  and  these  were 
distributed  approximately  equally  among  the  14  survey  versions,  with  11  versions  having  5 
comparisons and 3 having 3 comparisons (though approximately equal numbers of each were 
represented in the overall survey).  
  After completing the focus groups and interviews, a pre-test survey was mailed to 150 
randomly  selected  households  in  the  San  Joaquin  Valley.  For  sampling  purposes  in  the  full 
survey, the San Joaquin Valley was divided into six strata, depending on geography (North, 
Central, South) and community size (urban and rural). A random sample of 1,000 households 
was  drawn,  with  approximately  equal  numbers  from  each  of  the  six  strata.  The  survey  was 
conducted following the principles of the Total Design Method (Dillman). Of the 1,000 surveys 
sent in the  initial  mailing, 882 were deliverable, and a  total of 391 completed surveys were 
returned, for a response rate (percentage of deliverables) about 44%.   Despite extra effort to 
reach Hispanic households,
6 a sizeable chunk of which are transient due to job requirements, the 
response rate among this group (roughly 34% of the total) was 26%, while the response rate for 
non-Hispanic  households  was  53%.    Of  the  391  returned  surveys,  responses  from  375 
households contained at least one useable choice occasion, and a total of 1,824 choice occasions 
were used in the estimation sample. 
                                                 
6 Since a significant proportion of San Joaquin Valley residents speak Spanish in their homes, the letter 
accompanying the first round of surveys contained a sentence at the bottom written in Spanish, asking households to 
check the adjacent box if they would like a survey version in Spanish. For the next 2 mailings, Hispanic names were 
identified in the mailing list, and these households received both English and Spanish cover letters and surveys. In 
total, 20 households completed and returned Spanish versions of the survey. 




  Individuals’  preferences  for  public  goods  like  seasonal  and  permanent  wetlands  and 
quasi-public goods like agricultural land are likely to vary within a population.  To capture taste 
variation we use a repeated mixed logit (RXL) model as the basis for our willingness-to-pay 
estimates.  In an RXL model, individuals are modeled as making decisions sequentially, which 
fits the panel structure of the data.  Because the contingent valuation responses can be interpreted 
as a choice experiments with a restricted set of alternatives (i.e., the status quo with one, rather 
than two, program options), the two data sets are combined for purposes of estimation. 
  The core of the RXL model is an individual’s conditional indirect utility: 
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Here  i  indexes  individuals,  j  indexes  choice  alternatives,  and  t  is  the  choice  occasion.  
Explanatory variables observable to the researcher are collected in Xijt, and the error terms      
are IID Type 1 Extreme Value (EV1).  We model individual i’s utility from salinity management 
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A maximum of 3 alternatives are presented to an individual during a single choice occasion in 
our sample.  Under this structure, the alternative index value of zero is reserved for the “No 
Plan”  alternative.  Here  xijt  contains  only  variables  describing  salinity  management  outcomes 
(1) 
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under  alternative  j  faced  by  an  individual  on  occasion  t.    The  model  also  includes  a  fixed, 
alternative-specific constant    for the choice of management vs. no management. 
  Our model captures two sources of individual heterogeneity.  Random parameters    are 
assumed to be independent and randomly distributed in the population.  We also include a set of 
independent, mean-zero normally-distributed error components   ,…,   for two purposes.  The 
first  is  our  implementation  of  a  mixed  logit  analogue  to  the  nested  logit  structure  using 
dispersion parameters    and     suggested by Walker et al.  These parameters allow us to 
model variance specific to utility over salinity management and the status quo, respectively, and 
induce correlation between the two salinity management utilities. Finally, following Hensher et 
al., we allow  for differences  in  scale across the CV and CE components of the data set by 
including the dispersion parameter    , which is activated by an indicator     for choice CV 
occasions.
7  
  The model is estimated following procedures discussed by Greene and Hensher and by 
Train.  Briefly, consider a generic RXL model where individual i's utility of alternative j on 
choice occasion t is      =   
      +     , and i’s parameter vector    is distributed with density 
 (  | ).   Here the      are once again IID EV1, and   collects all parameters of the density for 
  .  Conditional on   , the probability that an individual is observed making choice sequence 





























                                                 
7Since during CV choice occasions alternative j is censored, a term including     is not incorporated into the utility 
statement for alternative 2.  
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 Since    is not observed by the econometrician, it is necessary to integrate over its support to 
obtain the unconditional probability of observing choice sequence k,    : 
  k k ) ) ( | )d ( ( i i i i i P S f        
Since a closed form solution for    ( ) is usually unavailable, it must be approximated through 
simulation.  This is accomplished by calculating 
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Here    
 |   is  the       draw  from   (  | ).  The  simulated  probability      ( )  is  an  unbiased 
estimator of the true probability    ( ), with variance decreasing in the number of draws  .  The 
simulated log-likelihood for the RXL model is 
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Here     = 1 when an individual i is observed selecting choice sequence  .  In our analysis we 
Modified  Latin  Hyper  Cube  Sampling  (MLHS)  as  the  basis  for  draws  from  the  parameter 
distribution.  This technique provides random draws that deliver a more accurate approximation 
of the choice probabilities than independent random draws (Hess et al.). 
  For  preliminary  welfare  evaluations,  we  use  the  sample  mean  unconditional 
compensating variation (CV) of a shift from the status quo to a particular scenario: 
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where   
  and   
  are explanatory variables associates with the deviation from the status quo and 
the status quo, respectively, and    is marginal utility of income.
8   
Results 
  Estimation  results  are  reported  in  Table  2.    Model  1  assumes  salinity  management 
variables  have  fixed  coefficients,  while  model  2  introduces  random  coefficients  on  program 
attributes (other than monthly cost).  The coefficient on premature deaths due to poor air-quality 
is  log-normally  distributed  in  model  2  so  the  variable  is  scaled  by  negative  one  in  that 
specification.    The  coefficients  on  land  in  agricultural  production  and  land  in  seasonal  and 
permanent wetlands are triangularly distributed in model 2.   
In both model 1 and model 2, variables related to salinity management have the expected 
sign and with the exception of the dispersion parameter for  land  in seasonal and permanent 
wetlands  are  significant  at the  1%  level.    The  insignificant  dispersion  parameter  on  land  in 
seasonal and permanent wetlands is evidence against the presence of taste heterogeneity for that 
public good.   The variable capturing scale differences between the contingent valuation and 
choice  experiment  components  of  the  data,     ,  is  significant  at  the  5%  level  in  both 
specifications.  However, in each case a straightforward likelihood ratio test fails to reject the 
restriction of     to one at the same significance level.  These findings taken together provide 
evidence against the presence of scale differences between the CV and CE responses. 
 We experimented with a variety of distributions for the salinity management program 
variables.    Our  preferred  specification  for  the  purpose  of  welfare  analysis  is  model  2.    A 
                                                 
8 Both of the RXL specifications in the next section include the monthly cost of the salinity management alternative 
with a fixed coefficient. Preliminary draft – please do not cite without authors’ permission 
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straightforward pair-wise application of the likelihood dominance criterion (Pollak and Wales) 
indicates that model 2 dominates model 1.    
Table 3 reports estimates of the mean unconditional willingness-to-pay for incremental 
changes public goods produced by salinity management based on our preferred specification.  
Mean  monthly  willingness-to-pay  for  each  good  is  positive,  as  are  lower  bounds  on  the 
associated 95% confidence intervals.  Mean monthly willingness to pay for an increase in 1 
million  acres  of  land  in  agricultural  production  or  a  decrease  in  1,000  premature  deaths  is 
approximately $25, and about $0.22 for one thousand additional acres of seasonal and permanent 
wetlands. 
Discussion 
  The  household-level  costs  and  benefits  of  salinity  management  is  an  important topic 
about which relatively little is known, particularly in the United States. There are two broad 
categories  of  costs  of  salinity  to  households:  (1)  the  increases  in  the  cost  of  operating, 
maintaining, and replacing household appliances and plumbing, and (2) possible changes in a 
variety of public goods whose availability or quality may be affected by increases in salinity. The 
first  category  has  received  some,  though  not  extensive,  attention  in  the  literature,  while  the 
second  has,  to  our  knowledge,  received  little  or  no  attention.    To  help  bridge  the  gap  in 
information about the expected costs of salinity increases, this paper analyzes data from a survey 
of  willingness  to  fund  salinity  management  plans  conducted  among  households  in  the  San 
Joaquin Valley of California.  Our preliminary findings are that willingness to pay for salinity 
management  programs  is  low,  but  marginal  increases  in  associated  public  goods  generate 
statistically-significant positive willingness to pay.  Should this former result withstand scrutiny 
from extensions to our econometric analysis (discussed below), several factors may be at work.  Preliminary draft – please do not cite without authors’ permission 
17 
 
One is the relatively low household incomes in the Valley, which are considerably below the 
statewide  average.    Second  is  the  subtle,  long-term  nature  of  salinity  as  an  environmental 
management problem; that is, salinity accumulation occurs at a relatively long time scale, and its 
effects are difficult to detect by the average household. Third, evidence from pretest interviews 
suggests a higher-than-typical skepticism about the efficacy of government programs generally.  
These  elements  may  be  underpinning  to our  preliminary  finding  that  willingness  to  pay  for 
salinity  management  without  the  associated  public  negative  (as  indicated  by  the  statistically 
significant and relatively large negative management constant    in both model 1 and model 2).  
When sufficiently large amounts of the public goods are also produced by salinity management, 
willingness  to  pay  becomes  positive,  but this  may  be  at  levels  of  the  public  goods that  are 
infeasible to produce. 
We intend to extend our preliminary analysis in a number of directions.  Our first priority 
is to study the distributions of individual-level willingness-to-pay for a particular public good or 
salinity management policy (Greene et al.).  There are also several possible extensions to the 
repeated  mixed  logit  model  that  we  employ,  including,  for  example,  allowing  for  state 
dependence engendered by the order of the contingent valuation module of the survey relative to 
the choice experiments.  The idea would be to test for a similar state-dependence effect that has 
been examined in studies that estimate models using combined revealed and stated preference 
data (Whitehead et al.).  Finally, Campbell presents a method for uncovering determinants of 
individual willingness-to-pay in a second-stage analysis based on random effects models.  This 
approach may yield substantial additional insights into the structure of preferences among San 
Joaquin Valley residents for salinity management, for example differences between urban and 
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Table 1. Levels of the Salinity Program Attributes Used in the Contingent Valuation and 
Choice Experiments  
Contingent Valuation 
Attribute  No Plan  Management Plan 
Land in agricultural 
cropland  (million acres) 
 
1.9  2.3 
Land in seasonal 
and permanent wetlands 
(thousand acres) 
 
24  88 




10.9  10.4 
Cost to your 
household (dollars/month)  0  3 to 54
a 
Choice Experiments 
Attribute  No Plan  Management Plan A and B 
Land in agricultural 
cropland  (million acres) 
 
1.9  2.1, 2.3, 2.5 
Land in seasonal 
and permanent wetlands 
(thousand acres) 
 
24  57, 88, 112 
 




10.9  10.1, 9.5, 8.9 
Cost to your 
household (dollars/month)  0  9, 15, 28 
Note: a. Monthly cost varies by treatment (single bound vs. double bound) and question number (in the double  
              bound version). 
 




Table 2. Estimation Results (Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Variable  Parameter
a  Model 1
b  Model 2
c 
Land in agricultural cropland 
(million acres) 
Mean coefficient  2.2782  2.1368 
(0.4962)  (0.6908) 
  Dispersion coefficient  -  11.5564 
-  (1.4890) 
Land in seasonal and permanent 
wetlands (thousand acres) 
Mean coefficient  0.0144  0.0189 
(0.0031)  (0.004) 
  Dispersion coefficient  -  0.0049 





Mean coefficient  -1.6513  0.4623 
(0.1667)  (0.1342) 
  Dispersion coefficient  -  0.8001 
-  (0.1120) 
Cost (dollars/month)
  Mean coefficient  -0.0674  -0.0906 
(0.0131)  (0.0178) 
    Mean coefficient  -3.3369  -3.8278 
(0.6931)  (0.7664) 
  
  Dispersion coefficient  -2.9203  2.592 
(0.2903)  (0.4213) 
   
  Dispersion coefficient  0.4558  -0.7932 
(0.1671)  (0.2149) 
   
  Dispersion coefficient  1.5207  1.259 
(0.4757)  (0.6031) 
Log-likelihood at convergence:  -1,151.74  -1,105.2773 
Notes:    a. For triangularly distributed parameters, the dispersion coefficient is the spread of the variable’s 
                  distribution (or √6	 times the standard deviation of the associated parameter distribution).   
                  For log-normally distributed variables, the dispersion coefficient is the standard deviation of the  
                   natural log of the variable. 
              b. Both model 1 and model 2 were estimated using 5,000 MLHS draws. 
              c. In model 2, the coefficients on land in agricultural cropland and land in seasonal and permanent 
                   wetlands are assumed to follow a triangular distribution.  The coefficient on air quality effects is 
                   log-normally distributed. 
  d. Air quality effects are scaled by -1 in model 2 since the coefficient is log-normally distributed. 
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Table 3. Willingness-to-pay for Incremental Changes 
Policy Variable  MWTP (2007 dollars/month)  95% CI
a 
Land in agricultural 
cropland  (million acres) 
24.8942  (7.1024, 48.8444) 
Land in seasonal 
and permanent wetlands 
(thousand acres) 
0.2172  (0.1027, 0.3897) 
Air quality
b 
(thousand premature deaths/year) 
25.0233  (16.9166, 37.7491) 
Notes: a. Confidence interval calculated following Krinsky and Robb using 2,000 draws. 
   b. The value reported here is for a reduction of 1,000 premature deaths per year. 
 
.  
 